Image courtesy of The Economist
Iranians are not yearning for empty slogans, personality cults, or even lofty notions of democracy. What they desire most is a well-managed, accountable government that can restore economic dignity and allow them to live a zendegi-e normal—a “normal life” free from the suffocating grip of a state that polices what they wear, what they watch, how they love, whom they worship, and even what they eat and drink. — Karim Sadjadpour
Introduction
Forty-seven years have passed since Ayatollah Khomenei, returning from fifteen years in exile, disembarked from his Air France flight from Paris. “Our final victory will come when all foreigners are out of the country…I beg God to cut off the hands of all evil foreigners and all their helpers,” the founder of Iran’s Islamic Republic would preach to gathered crowds.1 Four decades later, the greatest threat to his theocratic project is not a CIA-supported coup but his own suffering compatriots. In a nation whose politics and broader sense of self have been defined by justified paranoia oriented towards the West, Iranians themselves now appear set to topple Khamenei’s repressive regime.
As the once formidable theocratic government in Iran crumbles, the nation appears to be on the cusp of political upheaval. Militarily incapacitated by Israeli and American missiles, geopolitically isolated by the collapse of regional allies, and under pressure domestically from a wave of protests emerging across major urban centers, the Islamic Republic is struggling to sustain itself.2 From the ashes of a Mullah-ruled Iran, may just emerge a nation willing to collaborate with the West to stabilize the Middle East.
Protests
Economic difficulties have massacred the clerics’ remaining legitimacy. Annual inflation exceeding 40% alongside the catastrophic devaluation of the Iranian Rial has put pressure on citizens already suffering from crippling Western sanctions. For years, youth unemployment, currently sitting around 24.3%, has been rising, as disillusioned young people turn to illicit means to sustain themselves.3 Their demonstrations on university campuses and in city centers have catalyzed large segments of the public—even many from the low-income conservative base and the urban middle class have taken up slogans.
Protesters have moved beyond economic grievances and seized the opportunity to express broader anti-government sentiment. “For years now, we have slowly but surely made significant changes to our lifestyles because of this corrupt government. This was the last nail in the coffin. We wanted this regime gone, and now there’s no way this regime will continue,” says a shopkeeper in Tehran.4 Power shortages have become endemic. The cost of living has outpaced wage growth for years. Food scarcity and drought have become the norm. A government diverting funds to its military to prepare for external threats has weakened its domestic defenses: welfare programs.5 Now, confronted with unrest, the clerics have replaced subsidies with bullets. According to Amnesty International, at least 28 protesters and bystanders have been killed.6 The real death toll is most likely much higher. Iranians and the world hold their breath: what’s next for the nation of 92 million?
Forward?
The Islamic Republic marks only a blip in the 2,500-year history of Persian civilization, a history with only brief periods of parliamentary democracy. The likelihood that Iran’s theocracy will fall and be replaced by a liberal-democratic system is at best very unlikely. Iran has never had a democratically elected head of state. An inclination towards a strongman is natural when surrounded by incessant instability. The opposition figure, whose name echoes in Iranian streets and adorns picket signs, promises to prolong that autocratic legacy. Reza Pahlavi, the son of Iran’s last American-backed Shah, has been rallying the masses from the safety of his D.C. residence. On his Instagram (@pahlavicomms), the crown prince calls on members of the armed forces to take up arms against the government to “protect [their] and [their] families’ future.”7
If, in place of the Shah, the IRGC, the regime’s revolutionary military force, attempts to consolidate its power, Iran may transition to the Pakistani model. Karim Sadjadpour, writer for Foreign Affairs magazine and senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment, argues that IRGC generals could replace Islamism with a brand of UltraNationalism, while remaining domestically repressive and hostile to the West.8 This new brand of leaders would use nationalism to pacify the populace while retaining a complete control over civil society.
Alternatively, the regime could outlast the protests and instead pursue a reformist agenda, shedding revolutionary ideology in favor of pragmatism. China offers a successful model for such a pivot. Focusing on economic development, lifting millions out of poverty, and modernizing the country would help restore clerical legitimacy. An Islamic Republic focused on the economy could renew ties with the U.S. and reopen itself to the wider world. However, the expansion of civil rights alongside economic growth is improbable.
At best, Iranians could hope for a Turkish model. Empowering elected institutions like the Majlis and repurposing local councils established nationwide could herald a new era of democracy.9 Populist forces promising material advancement for the masses would most likely thrive, and the transformation would fall short of engineering a liberal society capable of supporting elections. The dream of Iranian pluralism remains alien.
A few miles from the Shah-apparent, another D.C. resident has also made statements regarding the ongoing unrest. “You better not start shooting because we’ll start shooting too,” said Donald Trump on Friday.10 Whether foreign intervention will be necessary—or welcome—is yet to be seen.
Conclusion
Weakened by war with Israel, the ayatollah Ali Khamenei would not be the first Middle Eastern despot to fall. But his regime’s implosion would mark the end of a dreadful chapter in Middle Eastern history. What remains of the Islamic Republic’s axis of resistance would crumble, heralding a new era of peace…or massive bloodletting. Protesters, fed up with unabating hunger and censorship, risk their lives today to fight for a better tomorrow for themselves and the rest of the world.
Bibliography
Amnesty International. “Iran: Deaths and injuries rise amid authorities’ renewed cycle of protest bloodshed.” January 8, 2026. https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2026/01/iran-deaths-injuries-authorities-protest-bloodshed/.
Apple Jr., R. W. “Khomeini Arrives in Teheran, Urges Ouster of Foreigners; Millions Rally to Greet Him.” The New York Times. February 1, 1979. https://www.nytimes.com/1979/02/01/archives/khomeini-arrives-in-teheran-urges-ouster-of-foreigners-millions.html. Accessed January 10, 2026.
CNBC. “New Trump warning as Iran cuts internet with protests across country.” January 10, 2026. https://www.cnbc.com/2026/01/10/new-trump-warning-as-iran-cuts-internet-with-protests-across-country.html.
Encyclopaedia Britannica. “2026 Iranian Protests.” Last modified January 10, 2026. https://www.britannica.com/event/2026-Iranian-Protests.
Instagram. “این پیامی مستقیم خطاب به نیروهای مسلح و امنیتی ایران است.” Post. Accessed January 10, 2026.
International Labour Organization. ILOSTAT. “Iran (Islamic Republic of) — Country Profile.” Accessed January 10, 2026. https://ilostat.ilo.org/data/country-profiles/irn/.
Parent, Deepa. “Two people confirmed dead as Iran protests turn into ‘battlefield’.” The Guardian. January 1, 2026. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2026/jan/01/two-people-dead-iran-economic-crisis-protests-battlefield.
Sadjadpour, Karim. “The Autumn of the Ayatollahs: What Kind of Change Is Coming to Iran?” Foreign Affairs 104, no. 6 (November/December 2025). Published October 14, 2025. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/autumn-ayatollahs.
R. W. Apple Jr., “Khomeini Arrives in Teheran, Urges Ouster of Foreigners; Millions Rally to Greet Him,” The New York Times, February 1, 1979, https://www.nytimes.com/1979/02/01/archives/khomeini-arrives-in-teheran-urges-ouster-of-foreigners-millions.html (accessed January 10, 2026).
Deepa Parent, “Two people confirmed dead as Iran protests turn into ‘battlefield’,” The Guardian, January 1, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2026/jan/01/two-people-dead-iran-economic-crisis-protests-battlefield.
International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT, “Iran (Islamic Republic of) — Country Profile,” accessed January 10, 2026, https://ilostat.ilo.org/data/country-profiles/irn/.
Deepa Parent, “Two people confirmed dead as Iran protests turn into ‘battlefield’,” The Guardian, January 1, 2026, https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2026/jan/01/two-people-dead-iran-economic-crisis-protests-battlefield.
“2026 Iranian Protests,” Encyclopaedia Britannica, last modified January 10, 2026, https://www.britannica.com/event/2026-Iranian-Protests.
Amnesty International, “Iran: Deaths and injuries rise amid authorities’ renewed cycle of protest bloodshed,” January 8, 2026, https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2026/01/iran-deaths-injuries-authorities-protest-bloodshed/.
Instagram, “این پیامی مستقیم خطاب به نیروهای مسلح و امنیتی ایران است,” post, accessed January 10, 2026, instagram.com//p/DTMnX2cjuEJ/.
Karim Sadjadpour, “The Autumn of the Ayatollahs: What Kind of Change Is Coming to Iran?,” Foreign Affairs 104, no. 6 (November/December 2025), published October 14, 2025, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/autumn-ayatollahs.
ibid.
“New Trump warning as Iran cuts internet with protests across country,” CNBC, January 10, 2026, https://www.cnbc.com/2026/01/10/new-trump-warning-as-iran-cuts-internet-with-protests-across-country.html.


Free Iran!
https://open.substack.com/pub/sergemil/p/a-turning-point-for-iran-and-the